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1 Introduction
Financial crises are recurring phenomena in modern economies. The crisis of 2007-2009
was a stark reminder of the treacherous nature of financial crashes because it took almost
the whole world by surprise. The search for its underlying causes has consequently revived
academic interest in financial crises and their history (see Rajan (2010); Bordo and Meissner
(2012); Gorton (2012); Schularick and Taylor (2012), among others). Income inequality
has received increasing attention because it was highly elevated before the crisis of 2007-
2009 (as it was before the Great Depression), and it has remained high in many developed
economies after the crisis (Alvaredo et al. 2013). However, there is no consensus on the
role that income inequality plays as a driver of financial crises and the channels it works
through. There is not even a consensus whether real (macroeconomic) or financial factors
play a more important role in predicting financial crises.
In this paper, we contribute to the discussion around the drivers of financial crises in two
ways. First, we consider a long time-series and a relatively large set of real and financial
variables that have been identified as potential drivers of crises in the previous literature to
gain a more comprehensive understanding of their respective roles. On the real side, our
major factor of interest is income inequality. While its role on the onset of financial crises
has recently been studied in a number of theoretical contributions, the empirical evidence is
scant and mixed. Some papers find that income inequality increases the probability of finan-
cial crises (Roy and Kemme 2012) or drives credit booms (Perugini et al. 2015; Klein 2015;
Malinen 2016), whereas others do not find income inequality to be a consistent ingredient
in the growth of bank loans (Bordo and Meissner 2012) or the development of financial
crises (Atkinson and Morelli 2011). On the financial side, Schularick and Taylor (2012)
point to credit booms as the primary contributor to financial crises in developed countries
over the past 140 years (see also Lang and Schmidt (2016)). In a recent paper, Jorda et al.
(2015) show that mortgage lending to households in particular has increased considerably
over the past century and Jorda et al. (2013) link credit booms to the severity of economic
downturns. However, Gorton (2012) links abnormal credit growth to only one out of three
financial crises that occurred during the period between 1970 and 2007. Rivas and Perez-
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Quiros (2015) also show that the role of credit in the identification of the business cycle
was very limited before the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Therefore, by themselves, credit
booms appear to be insufficient prerequisites of financial crises.1
Second, in our analysis we explicitly consider the various channels through which in-
come inequality may impact financial crises and study whether income inequality is a direct
driver of crises or whether it is the real root-cause behind the financial drivers such as credit
booms. Iacoviello (2008) provides compelling evidence that income inequality was the pri-
mary driver of the increase in household debt in the United States during the 1980s and
1990s. Kumhof et al. (2015) show that inequality can raise leverage in middle-income and
poor households as a result of consumption smoothing by borrowing against future incomes.
Linking these findings to the credit boom literature implies that income inequality might be
the actual real-side root cause of the risk of financial instability that has thus far been fully
and directly attributed to credit bubbles. In a similar vein, Rajan (2010) argues that rising
inequality caused redistribution in the form of subsidized housing finance, which led to the
housing boom and the subsequent crash.
Our empirical evidence comes from a dataset of 14 developed countries over the 1870-
2008 period. Our modeling strategy allows the predictive power to be distributed among a
large set of variables and examines these potential predictors and their lags in joint mod-
els. Importantly, we employ a methodology that allows for a flexible general-to-specific
model selection between different predictors without imposing restrictive assumptions on
the channels through which, e.g., income inequality impacts the risk of financial crises.
More specifically, we begin with (the year-to-year change) in the top 1% income share as
our measure of income inequality, real bank loans, gross real investments, the real current
account balance, broad money (M2), gross real government debt, the real price of stocks,
short-term real interest rates and six lags of each factor. We also add a dummy variable
indicating when a deposit insurance scheme was introduced.2 In each step of our empir-
1In addition to income inequality and credit booms, other factors that have been proposed to explain the
occurrence of financial crises include collapses of asset bubbles, deregulation, financial innovations, move-
ments of real interest rates, deposit insurance schemes, the growth of the monetary base, and current account
imbalances (see Gorton (1988); Calvo et al. (1994); Stoker (1994); Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998);
Brunnermeier (2008); Tett (2009); In’t Veld et al. (2011); Davis et al. (2016)).
2We experimented also with a dummy variable indicating the existence of a central bank, but it failed to
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ical analysis, we then apply a general-to-specific model selection procedure to obtain the
most parsimonious choice of variables that provides the most predictive information on the
probability of a financial crisis. In addition, we consider various out-of-sample forecasting
checks to assess the robustness of our in-sample results.
Our results hint at a distinct role for income inequality as a driver of financial crises,
while we confirm that credit booms do play a role in creating financial instability. Alto-
gether, our results suggest that the drivers of financial crises tend to vary in time and between
crises.
Specifically, our empirical analysis yields four main findings. First, income inequality
is an influential factor in our in-sample results: the top 1% income share (our measure of
income inequality) has the highest individual predictive power and yields additional pre-
dictive power over and above the previously used factors, such as real bank loans, when
included in a joint model. Second, the role of bank loans as an in-sample predictor of finan-
cial crises diminishes considerably when jointly controlling for several other factors. Third,
multivariable recursive out-of-sample results underpin the importance of using various pre-
dictive variables in the model. Fourth, studying our predictors individually in out-of-sample
forecasts for different time periods shows that income inequality and current account con-
tain predictive power in each forecasting period but that the predictive power of most factors
tends to vary considerably over time. This finding implies that focusing on shorter time
periods may lead to incomplete conclusions regarding the drivers of financial crises.
The focus of this paper is on the long time series, which we exploit to achieve a maxi-
mally comprehensive picture of the roles of various real and financial factors in predicting
crises in general and to determine whether and how these roles vary among different crises.
The long time series is also essential for performing out-of-sample forecasting. This long-
term focus comes at a cost: some factors that have potentially gained importance since the
1980s, when financial liberalization began, must be neglected because the data for the in-
dicators of financial innovation and deregulation are available only for comparatively short
time periods. However, we examine an in-sample robustness check for the 1962-2008 pe-
have any statistically significant effect on the probability of a financial crisis.
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riod, for which we have available data on the size of the US mutual fund industry as an
indicator of investments in innovative and potentially riskier investment classes. The results
confirm the full-sample findings. In addition, the results show that a larger US mutual fund
industry increases the risk of a financial crisis, but only immediately before a crisis erupts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related
literature and how it motivates our choice of predictor variables and our data. Section 3
outlines the methodology, and Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Financial Crises and Their Predictors
2.1 Predictors of Financial Crises
In his seminal paper, Gorton (1988) links the systemic nature of banking panics to the busi-
ness cycle. One of the strongest signals of an upcoming recession is a decline in investment
expenditures (Zarnowitz and Moore 1982; De Long and Summers 1991; Crowder and de
Jong 2011). Investment expenditures also reflect the level of aggregate demand for capital
goods in the economy. In addition, the nature of investments might influence the probability
of a crisis (see Schularick and Taylor 2012). If the money available in an economy is in-
vested productively rather than driving consumption or speculation, then it should lower the
risk that a crisis will occur. Therefore, we account for the change in real gross investments
in our empirical analysis.
The idea that financial crises are driven by credit boom and bust cycles has long been
stipulated in the literature (Minsky 1977; Kindleberger 1978). Additionally, recent stud-
ies have found that large credit booms are associated with financial crises (Bordo et al.
2001; Mendoza and Terrones 2008; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009; Schularick and Taylor 2012).
The increased leverage and the potential concurrent decrease in lending standards introduce
fragilities into the banking system and make it vulnerable. We measure the evolution of
credit in each country by the change in real bank loans.
As Claessens et al. (2010) document, one of the similarities between previous financial
crises and the recent crisis is that they are preceded by asset price booms. Increased asset
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prices may lead to an increase in lending against higher collateral values, which in turn fur-
ther increases asset prices. Once this spiral of activity stops, households and firms struggle
to pay back their accumulated debt. This type of asset price boom, which eventually threat-
ens the stability of the financial system, could be observed in the US and in many European
countries in the run-up to the recent crisis. In contrast, the tech bubble at the end of the
1990s and the beginning of the 2000s did not result in a massive systemic financial crisis. In
our empirical analysis, we account for asset price booms by the change in the real value of
stock market indexes.3
Current account imbalances and short-term interest rates may also contribute to the de-
velopment of financial crises. A current account deficit implies that the economy consumes
more than it produces such that other countries lend their savings to this economy. Such
capital inflows may lead to stock market bubbles and the excessive expansion of domestic
credit and may cause inflationary pressures (Calvo et al. 1994; Caballero 2014). Davis et
al. (2016) find that an increase in debt matters for the outbreak of a crisis especially if the
current account deficit of a country is large. We use the change in the real value of the
current account as a measure of international capital flows. Jorda et al. (2015) show that
environments with low interest rates lead to an increase in mortgage lending and housing
price booms and ultimately lead to financial instability. In contrast, increasing interest rates
can hurt banks’ balance sheets if banks cannot quickly increase their lending rates. Alterna-
tively, if an interest rate increase can be passed on to borrowers, such an action can increase
the number of non-performing loans and the risk of moral hazard on the borrowers’ side
(Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 1998). In our empirical analysis, we account for the real
short-term interest rate.
Recently, a growing body of literature has developed theories and arguments as to how
income inequality can contribute to financial instability and thereby increase the likelihood
of a crisis through various channels, such as credit and asset price booms or current account
imbalances. These channels emphasize that asset and credit bubbles might actually develop
as a result of real causes.
3In one of our robustness checks, we use a shorter sample period and account for housing price changes,
for which data coverage is much less comprehensive.
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Rajan (2010) argues that rising inequality forced US politicians to enact measures to
better the situation of low- and middle-income households to avoid losing them as voters.
Because redistribution in the form of social security payments or increased taxes for the
rich are impossible solutions in the US political environment, redistribution in the form of
subsidized housing finance was expedited. This provision of inexpensive mortgage lending
together with the concurrent deregulation of the financial sector in turn led to the observed
housing boom and the subsequent crash.
Kumhof et al. (2015) model a more direct link between income inequality and increasing
debt levels that does not rely on a specific political system. In their closed-economy model,
crises emerge endogenously as a result of rising income inequality because low-income and
middle-income households seeking to maintain their levels of consumption must borrow
more as their real wages decrease, whereas the top 5% of income earners provide the funding
for these loans. Extending the model to an international environment with open economies,
Kumhof et al. (2012) show that rising inequality increases the risk of financial crises because
it endogenously leads to credit expansion, increased leverage and increased current account
deficits.4
Fitoussi and Saraceno (2010) argue that income inequality leads to depressed aggregate
demand, which induces central banks to maintain low interest rates, thereby contributing
to the accumulation of private debt. Simultaneously, those who benefit from increasing
inequality search for high-yield investments and drive asset bubbles. The increase in non-
performing loans after the burst of the asset bubble then exposes the banking sector to the
risk of a run. Similarly, Stockhammer (2015) suggests that increased income inequality
leads to more speculation or risk-taking because the consumption opportunities of those
benefiting from increasing incomes become exhausted, and speculative investments become
more likely. Atkinson and Morelli (2011) argue that banks also take higher risks when
income inequality is elevated and that this risk-taking occurs through securitization. In our
empirical analysis, we measure income inequality using the top 1% income share of the
population.
4See also Seppecher and Salle (2015).
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To complete our pool of potential crisis predictors, we use three additional variables that
have been shown to help predict financial crises in previous studies. First, we control for
the potential impact of monetary aggregates on the probability of a financial crisis using
the change in broad money (M2). Second, government debt was found to be relevant to the
financial sector (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 1998). A government that is short of funds
may postpone measures aimed at strengthening banks’ balance sheets. However, even if a
government is prepared to support the country’s banking sector despite budgetary problems,
the public might not trust such an endeavor, which could in turn trigger a bank run. Third,
deposit insurance is typically designed and introduced to prevent depositors from running
and thereby threatening the stability of the financial system. Meanwhile, the existence of
deposit insurance introduces a moral hazard on the bank managers’ side because they have
an incentive to increase their risk-taking, knowing that the deposit insurance scheme will
pay depositors if the risky investments go bad. Deposit insurance may therefore actually
increase the likelihood of financial crises despite its intended stabilizing effect (Demirgüc-
Kunt and Detragiache 1998). In our analysis, deposit insurance is a binary variable that
equals one in all years in which a country has an active deposit insurance scheme.
2.2 Data
Our primary source of data is the dataset compiled by Schularick and Taylor (2012). These
data cover 14 developed countries over the period from 1870 to 2008. The countries included
are Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. For the dependent
variable, we use the financial crisis episodes collected by Schularick and Taylor (2012),
who combine the datasets of Bordo et al. (2001), Laeven and Valencia (2008), Cecchetti et
al. (2009) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). In total, our dataset includes 79 country-year
financial crisis observations. The observed binary dependent variable yit takes the value one




 1, if there is a financial crisis in country i at time t,0,otherwise . (1)
Financial crises are defined as periods in which a country’s banking sector experiences
runs, sharp increases in default rates accompanied by large losses of capital leading to gov-
ernment interventions, bankruptcy, or forced mergers of financial institutions (see Schularick
and Taylor (2012) for details on the crisis data compilation). We assume that a crisis begins
(i.e., yit = 1) in the year when a country falls into the crisis.
We also obtain data on real bank loans, broad money (M2), government debt, and stock
market indexes from Schularick and Taylor (2012). In addition, we obtain data on invest-
ments and current account deficits from Taylor (2002) and from the World Bank World
Development Indicators, data on real GDP per capita from the Maddison Database of the
Groningen Growth and Development Center (Bolt and van Zanden 2014), and data on
the introduction of deposit insurance from the World Bank Deposit Insurance Database
(Demirgüc-Kunt et al. 2005).
Our data on the top 1% income share come from the Top Income Database by Alvaredo
et al. (2013). We use the top 1% income share for three reasons. First, several of the
theoretical channels presented in Section 2.1 concentrate on the relationship between the
accumulation of debt and the incomes of rich households making the top 1% income share
the proper measure of income inequality for this study. Second, calculating synthetic in-
dexes such as the Gini or Theil index requires accurate country-specific information, such
as the mean household (or person) income of a country. Such indexes may be unreliable be-
cause their calculation often ignores the fact that the underlying data contain inconsistencies
and anomalies that are likely to be country-dependent (Piketty 2014). In contrast, the top
income share measure is constructed using the same raw data and methodology for every
country (Piketty 2007).5 Third, the top 1% income share data are available for a time span
of approximately 100 years (albeit with gaps) for most of our sample countries, while the
5Nevertheless, Leigh (2007) demonstrates that the top 1% income share series has a high correlation with
other measures of income inequality, such as the Gini index.
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synthetic indexes generally cover only the past 40 years and often contain missing observa-
tions for several years. Because financial crises are an infrequent phenomenon in developed
economies, using synthetic indexes would restrict our analysis considerably and might lead
to incomplete conclusions. The focus of our study is instead on the long term to gain an
as comprehensive as possible picture of the (potentially varying) roles of different financial
and real factors in the run-up to different crises.
That said, Table 1 shows the number of observations available for each of our predictor
variables, emphasizing that our panel is unbalanced because the income inequality time
series starts in 1886 only and contains missing values in the early years of observation in
particular. We address this issue in the empirical analysis by studying various subsample
periods that yield more balanced panels. Table 1 also provides summary statistics for all
predictive variables.
3 Statistical Model
In this section, we describe the fixed-effects panel logit model and the model selection pro-
cess used throughout this study. Given that our dependent variable is binary, it is meaningful
to rely on binary response models rather than on the panel models designed for continu-
ous dependent variables. The latter models have various problems in the binary-dependent
framework. For example, the financial crisis probabilities do not necessarily fall within the
unit interval. In the model, we allow country-fixed effects to control for all time-invariant
heterogeneity at the country level. Such a model specification has the additional advantage
that our results are derived from within-country variation in the crisis predictors, eliminating
any potential bias that stems from different data-reporting standards in different countries.
Our basic model is essentially the same as that used by Schularick and Taylor (2012)
(see a more complete description of the model in Hsiao (2003, Chapter 7)), but our model
selection approach and our multivariable analysis differ considerably from theirs. We em-
ploy a methodology that allows for a more flexible general-to-specific model selection be-
tween different predictors without imposing restrictive assumptions on the channels through
which, e.g., income inequality impacts the risk of financial crises. We also allow the predic-
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tive power to be distributed among a considerably larger set of variables and examine these
potential predictors and their lags in joint models.
3.1 Logit Model
In the fixed-effects panel logit model (hereafter, logit model), conditional on the information
set at time t−1 (denoted by Ft−1) including, e.g., the relevant predictive variables, yit has a
Bernoulli distribution:
yit|Ft−1 ∼ B(pit), i = 1, . . . ,N, t = 1, . . . ,T. (2)
Let Et−1(·) and Pt−1(·) denote the conditional expectation and conditional probability, re-
spectively, given the information set Ft−1. Thus, the conditional probability that yit takes the
value 1 (i.e., that there is a financial crisis at time t in country i) can be written as
pit = Pt−1(yit = 1) = Et−1(yit) = Λ(πit), (3)
where πit is a linear function of variables included in the information set Ft−1, and Λ(·) is a





Following Schularick and Taylor (2012), we assume that the linear function πit has the form
πit = ωi + b1(L)x1it + . . .+ bK(L)xKit, (5)
where b j(L)x jit = b j1x ji,t−1 + . . .+ b jpx ji,t−p, j = 1, . . . ,K, and the country-specific vector ωi
includes all the deterministic terms (such as country-specific dummy variables), reflecting
the possible heterogeneity between countries. In model (5), the lag-polynomials for different
predictors have the form
b j(L) = b j1L + . . .+ b jpLp, j = 1, . . . ,K, (6)
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where L is the usual lag operator (i.e., Lkzt = zt−k). In other words, we explicitly allow
the possibility that the predictive power of different predictors is distributed among several
lags. Note that using the same lag length p in (6) for all predictors is only for notational
convenience and can easily be relaxed in practice (see Section 3.2). Notably, the polynomial
(6) begins with lag one (i.e., only the lags of the predictors are included in (5)).
The logit model can be conveniently estimated by using the maximum likelihood (ML)
method. Using the conditional probabilities constructed in (3), one can write the likeli-
hood function and obtain the ML estimates using numerical methods (see details, e.g., from
Hsiao (2003), pp. 194–199). In our setup, the number of cross-sectional units (countries) N
is small, whereas the length of the time series T is relatively long. Because the model is not
necessarily specified correctly, the ML estimator can be interpreted as a quasi-maximum-
likelihood estimator in the usual way. Therefore, to account for this possible misspecifica-
tion, we use robust standard errors for the estimated coefficients throughout this study.
3.2 Model Selection and Goodness-of-Fit Evaluation
Because our panel data are highly unbalanced, we need to pay special attention to the model
selection throughout the analysis. In particular, depending on the predictive variables in-
cluded in the model, the number of observations differs across different model specifications.
Therefore, the usual information criterion-based model selection procedures are not straight-
forwardly applicable. Nevertheless, using an unbalanced panel is common in the previous
crisis prediction literature because such a panel includes as much information as possible
given that different variables are available over different time spans (see, e.g., Demirgüc-
Kunt and Detragiache 1998; Barrell et al. 2010; Schularick and Taylor 2012).
The model selection employed in this study can be divided into two parts. First, we
are interested in examining which predictive variables should be included in the model.
Second, we need to determine for each variable how many lags p (see (5) and (6)) have
useful predictive power. In practice, the (optimal) lag lengths p for different predictors are
unknown. However, assuming that the upper bound, e.g., pmax, is known, we can use the
following sequential general-to-specific model selection method, which is essentially the
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same as the procedure proposed by researchers such as Lütkepohl (2007, pp. 143–144) for
vector autoregressive models. We begin with a large model containing all the explanatory
variables and their lags. To maintain a lag structure and thus predictive model that are as
parsimonious as possible, we consider lags up to six (i.e., pmax = 6) for each variable.6
After the parameters have been estimated, we examine the t-ratios of all variables at lag six.
We reduce the lag length of any variable by one if the t-ratio associated with the longest
lag coefficient is less than 1.65. We continue this procedure until all the t-ratios for the
remaining longest lags are larger than this threshold.
The predictive performance of the model is evaluated using two well-known goodness-
of-fit measures. For the binary dependent variables, various alternative measures are roughly
analogous to the coefficient of determination R2 used in linear models. As in Schularick and
Taylor (2012), one such alternative is McFadden’s pseudo-R2 measure, given as
pseudo−R2 = 1−Lu/Lc. (7)
In this expression, Lu is the maximum value of the estimated unconstrained log-likelihood
function, and Lc is its constrained counterpart in a model that contains only a constant term.
The form of (7) ensures that the values 0 and 1 correspond to “no fit” and “perfect fit,”
respectively, and that the intermediate values have roughly the same interpretation that R2
has in linear models.
Another evaluation criterion used in this study is the area under the receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve. The ROC curve methodology is a common evaluation criterion
for binary predictions and outcomes in other sciences. In addition to Schularick and Taylor
(2012), recent examples of economic and financial applications include Berge and Jorda
(2011) and Jorda and Taylor (2011).
Specifically in our application, the area under the ROC curve (AUROC) is used to evalu-
ate each model’s ability to distinguish between signals for financial crises yit = 1 and normal
periods yit = 0. Let us denote ŷit = 1 as a signal forecast for a crisis if the probability fore-
6We consider lags up to six years to keep the lag structure reasonable for our estimations. However, we
acknowledge that some of the factors such as income inequality take a longer time to manifest.
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casts (3) obtained with the logit model are pit > c for some threshold value c, and vice versa
for ŷit = 0. The ROC curve describes all possible combinations of the true positive rate
T PR(c) = P(ŷit = 1|yit = 1) and the false positive rate FPR(c) = P(ŷit = 1|yit = 0) that arise
as one varies the probability threshold c. The threshold c is allowed to vary from 0 to 1; the
ROC curve is traced out in T PR(c)&FPR(c) space describing the classification ability of
the model. In our application, in which financial crisis periods are rare, the determination of
a single threshold c is complicated. Hence, we believe that the ROC methodology is more
sensible than a method concentrating on the results based on one particular cutoff c.
To summarize the classification ability of a given model, the AUROC is a well-known
summary statistic. The value of AUROC=0.5 corresponds to a coin toss (i.e., the model has
no predictive power at all). In contrast, the value 1 signifies a perfect fit. Overall, a higher
value indicates superior classification ability.
4 Results
We begin our empirical analysis with in-sample estimations, the objective of which is to
distinguish between different predictors and their predictive power for financial crisis peri-
ods. The full sample results based on the entire (unbalanced) panel of countries during the
full time span of our data from 1870 (1886) to 2008 serve as our benchmark case because
they contain the maximal amount of information (Section 4.1). The subsequent analysis of
shorter sample periods can be regarded as a robustness check based on more balanced pan-
els (Section 4.2). We then proceed to an out-of-sample forecasting experiment for various
time periods to further assess the robustness of our results (Section 4.3) and to gain deeper
insights into how the predictive power of various factors might vary over time (Section 4.4).
In all estimations, we employ our variables in first differences to eliminate the stochastic
and deterministic trends they may include (see, e.g., Klein (2015); Malinen (2016)). All our
estimated models contain country-fixed effects to control for time-invariant heterogeneity at
the country level and to focus the analysis on within-country variation. We do not include
time-fixed effects in our panel logit model because the resulting model could be estimated
only using the years in which the dependent variable actually changes values. Given that
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financial crises are rather rare events in developed economies, we would lose most obser-
vations with such a procedure. As a robustness check we estimate OLS linear probability
models for each predictive variable separately and include time fixed effects (results are
available from the authors upon request). We find that the year effects are significant indi-
cating that there is a common global component that drives financial crises, while our main
findings on income inequality and credit growth still hold. But as Schularick and Taylor
(2012) argue such global trends are not known ex-ante and therefore are not of practical use
in out-of-sample forecasts.
4.1 Full Sample Predictions
We first estimate the fixed-effects logit model using one predictive variable at a time. We se-
lect the optimal lag length p for each variable using the sequential testing approach outlined
in Section 3.2. Table 2 reports the full sample results. For each predictor, the table displays
the optimal lag length and the values of the pseudo-R2 and the AUROC. The number of
observations differs for various predictors based on data availability.
Table 2 shows that the optimal lag length varies between two and five lags (with six lags
being the maximum that we studied). Two exceptions are the short-term real interest rate and
the indicator of whether a deposit insurance scheme is in place; as single predictors, these
do not have statistically significant predictive power at any lag length. Table 2 also shows
that our measure of income inequality (the top 1% income share) clearly yields the best
performance: income inequality appears to have substantial predictive power for financial
crises. Real bank loans constitute the second-best single predictor, with the second-highest
pseudo-R2 and AUROC. Overall, the pseudo-R2 level is not very high in any model, partly
reflecting the limited number of financial crises. However, the AUROC statistics obtained
are well above 0.5 for all predictors, indicating that the models can distinguish between
non-crisis and crisis periods.
Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Bordo et al. 2001; Mendoza and Terrones 2008;
Reinhart and Rogoff 2009; Schularick and Taylor 2012), our univariate results confirm that
an increase in credit (real bank loans) is an important predictor - or a warning signal -
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of financial crises. However, although some of these studies emphasize the singular role
of credit bubbles, our results suggest that other factors play at least an equally important
role. The fact that credit bubbles are not the only drivers of financial crises also appears to
be reasonable in light of Gorton’s (2012) finding that only approximately one-third of the
crises between 1970 and 2007 saw credit booms during their run-ups.
In the next step, we use a multi-predictor analysis to examine which of the effects sur-
vives the joint inclusion of various predictors in one model. For example, some of the
financial variables may actually present the channels through which the real factors predict
financial crises. Based on the previous literature and the results in Table 2, we continue our
analysis by focusing on models that contain real bank loans and income inequality. Table 3
reports the results for the full sample period.7 To compare our results to those of Schularick
and Taylor (2012) we first of all replicate their baseline specification, a model that contains
five lags of loan growth and country fixed effects, in column 1 of Table 3 and find exactly
the same results as they do. In column 2 we then add five lags of income inequality to the
Schularick and Taylor (2012) specification. We find that income inequality is a significant
predictor of financial crises beyond loan growth.
Having established the importance of studying further predictors of financial crises in
addition to loan growth, income inequality in particular, we continue by examining loan
growth and income inequality in a more flexible estimation set-up and let our model selec-
tion procedure decide on the lag structure. Columns 3 and 4 include the models containing
real bank loans (two lags) and the top 1% income (five lags) as predictors separately. These
two models replicate the Table 2 results of these two predictors, but we now present the
actual estimated coefficients of all included lags, facilitating a comparison with the model
containing both predictors (column 5). Column 5 of Table 3 again shows that both vari-
ables are significant predictors of financial crises in a joint model. The separate tests for the
predictive power of the lags of the variables are statistically significant at the 1% level and
are similar to the univariate results reported in columns 3 and 4. The values of the pseudo-
R2 and the AUROC in this joint specification are larger than in the single variable models.
7Canada and the Netherlands are omitted from some estimation samples because there were no financial
crises in Canada during the years 1924-2008 or in the Netherlands in 1925-1938 and 1993-1999.
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Thus, income inequality indeed appears to have additional predictive power over and above
bank loans (i.e., it does not merely affect the probability of a financial crisis via its possible
impact on credit growth).
In column 6 of Table 3, we interact real bank loans and the top 1% income share to
test whether income inequality and loan growth are indeed reinforcing drivers of crises, as
suggested by Rajan (2010) and Kumhof et al. (2015). We report only the first lag of the
interaction term because it appears that the other lags do not significantly predict a crisis.
The interaction term is significantly positive, and both main effects are also significantly
positive, implying that loan growth is more likely to lead to a crisis when income inequality
is high and vice versa.
How large, in economic terms, is the effect of income inequality on the probability of
a financial crisis? In Table 4 we shed light on this question from various perspectives. In
column 1 we present marginal effects for the full sample from our preferred baseline model
from Table 3, column 5. The sum of the marginal effects in this estimation is 0.06. Given
that the average change in the top 1% income share has a standard deviation of 0.72, this
result implies that a one standard deviation increase in the change in the top 1% income
share increases the probability of a crisis by 0.06*0.72 = 0.04, or 4 percentage points. This
effect is economically very large since the sample frequency of a crisis is just 4.5 percent.
Next, we compare the effect of different levels of income inequality on the likelihood
of a crisis. Column 2 of Table 4 restricts the estimation sample to all observations that
fall below the 25% percentile of the top 1% income share, which is 7.2. The sum of the
marginal effects in this specification is 0.04, while the standard deviation of the change in
income inequality in this sample is 0.31. Therefore, a one standard deviation increase in
the change in income inequality increases the likelihood of a crisis by about 0.01. Similarly,
column 3 reports these results for the estimation sample restricted to all observations that fall
above the 75% percentile of the top 1% income share, which is 11.7. In this specification,
a one standard deviation increase in the change in income inequality (1.07) increases the
likelihood of a crisis by about 0.09. Columns 4 and 5 then use Sweden and the US in the
early 2000s as examples for a country with low income inequality (Sweden with a top 1%
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income share of 6.2 on average between 2000 and 2008) vs. a country with high income
inequality (the US with a top 1% income share of 16.7 on average between 2000 and 2008).
The results are similar to those presented in columns 2 and 3 given that Sweden’s level of
income inequality is close to the 25% percentile and the US’s is quite close to, albeit higher
than, the 75% percentile. Accordingly, for Sweden, a one standard deviation increase in the
change in income inequality (0.26) increases the likelihood of a crisis by about 0.01. For the
US, a one standard deviation increase in the change in income inequality (0.57) increases the
likelihood of a crisis by about 0.08. Looking at a longer time period for the US, the average
change in the top 1% income share was 0.34 between 1980 and 2008 (increasing from
8.18 to 17.89). Evaluating the marginal effects at this number, we find that a one standard
deviation increase in the change in income inequality (0.75) increases the likelihood of a
crisis by about 0.04 (results are available from the authors upon request). In sum, these
computations show that income inequality is an economically relevant predictor of financial
crises especially in countries and time periods of relatively high income inequality.
In the next step, we augment the two-variable model presented in Table 3 with the ad-
ditional predictors introduced in Section 2, which have been identified by the previous liter-
ature as playing an important role. Again following the general-to-specific model selection
method introduced in Section 3.2, we first add all our remaining predictive variables and
their lags from one to six to the model presented in column 5 of Table 3. Then, we sequen-
tially exclude the longest lag in each step until its t-ratio is larger in absolute value than 1.65.
The resulting model is presented in Table 5.
Table 5 reveals several interesting findings. The top 1% share (income inequality) is
still a strong and statistically significant predictor, whereas the role of real bank loans is
now limited. In fact, its lagged values are not statistically significant, and the estimation
results presented in Table 5 remain qualitatively unchanged if bank loans are excluded from
the model (results are available upon request). This result is in contrast to the evidence
presented by Schularick and Taylor (2012), who find a strong role of loan growth when
employing the same dataset that we use. However, in contrast to our study, those researchers
do not employ as great a variety of predictors and lags in a joint model that is derived from
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a general-to-specific model selection process.
Table 5 also shows that factors beyond the change in income inequality have predictive
power over and above loan growth. As expected, the probability of financial crises increases
for countries that run current account deficits. The negative first lag of real stocks (as also
found by Schularick and Taylor (2012)) indicates that once an asset price boom begins to
revert, the probability of a financial crisis increases. However, monitoring the long-term
evolution of stock prices does not appear to be a useful tool for policy makers to predict
financial crises well in advance. Furthermore, we do not find a significant effect of real
short-term interest rates, perhaps because they affect credit growth and, through this channel,
increase the likelihood of a financial crisis rather than having direct predictive power.
In conclusion, the full sample results show that an increase in income inequality in-
creases the probability of financial crises. This finding is consistent with the anecdotal
evidence that both of the two fiercest crises in the US, the Great Depression and the recent
Great Recession, were preceded by high income inequality. This result also confirms the
reasoning in the academic literature that income inequality is one of the causes of financial
crises and rejects the suggestion that income inequality works solely through credit booms.
However, the full sample results also emphasize that the predictive power in the models is
clearly distributed among various predictors and their lags.
4.2 Subsample Predictions
In this section, we present the results of two robustness tests. First, we replicate our previous
analysis for the post-WW2 sample to examine whether the predictive power of the real
and financial variables depends on the sample period. The post-WW2 period provides an
important robustness check because Schularick and Taylor (2012) find "two eras of financial
capitalism" when they study money and credit before and after WW2. Additionally, some
of our predictor variables, particularly the top 1% income share, are available only for a
shorter time span. The panel is therefore much more balanced in the post-WW2 analysis,
which eases the comparison of effects between different variables. Second, we study two
further channels through which income inequality may have an impact on financial crises:
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housing price booms (Rajan 2010) and increased risk-taking by higher-income households
(Stockhammer 2015). Because indicators for both channels are available for much shorter
time periods than those employed in our primary analysis, we perform this robustness test
using our shortest sample period, which covers the years from 1962 to 2008.
One concern with our previous results might be that the top 1% income share has supe-
rior predictive performance because the sample period of this variable is so different from
the sample period of the other variables. In Table 6, we present the models, including one
predictor at a time, for the post-WW2 subsample, beginning in 1950. The numbers of obser-
vations are now much closer to one another for all variables. The results reveal that income
inequality is again the best single predictor in terms of the pseudo-R2 and the AUROC. With
regard to the other variables, real bank loans are still a useful predictor, although several
other variables have higher predictive power.
Table 7 presents the estimation results for the 1950-2008 subsample when we include
various predictors in the model. We use the same stepwise model selection procedure as in
Section 4.1. Overall, this robustness test yields results that are similar to the findings for the
full sample analysis (see Table 5). The primary differences are that the existence of deposit
insurance has predictive power in the post-WW2 sample, whereas the short-term interest
rates do not. The introduction of deposit insurance increases the likelihood of the outbreak
of a financial crisis, indicating that the inherent moral hazard problems may interfere with
the intended stabilizing effects of deposit insurance. The potentially destabilizing effect of
deposit insurance has long been discussed in the literature: Keely (1990), Demirgüc-Kunt
and Detragiache (1998), Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) and Anginer et al. (2014),
among others, find evidence of such an effect. In addition, consistent with the finding by
Schularick and Taylor (2012) that the share of credit in the economy has increased after
WWII, Table 7 suggests that credit booms play a more important role in the second half of
our observation period, with the lags of real bank loans being jointly statistically significant
at the 1% level. Meanwhile, income inequality is an equally strong predictor as it is in the
full sample analysis.8
8To broaden our view, we re-examine the post-WWII analysis using the income share received by the top
decile (10%) as an alternative measure of income inequality (e.g., Piketty and Saez 2003; Piketty 2014). The
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Our results thus far are indicative that income inequality is a contributing factor to fi-
nancial crises over and above credit growth, current account deficits, real interest rates and
stock price booms. However, as we outlined in Section 2, income inequality can also have
an effect on the development of a crisis through housing price booms (Rajan 2010) and in-
creased investment in risky assets by high-income households (Stockhammer 2015). To test
for the effects of housing price booms, we use housing price data from the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlement for the time span from 1970 to 2006. To account for investments in riskier
asset classes, we use data on the size of the US mutual fund industry (total assets held in
mutual funds as a share of total CRSP market capitalization) collected from the CRSP Mu-
tual Funds Data, which is available from 1962 onward. We estimate a restricted-form model
beginning with only those variables through which income inequality is expected to affect
the likelihood of crises. That is, the model includes real bank loans, housing prices, the size
of US mutual funds, real stocks, and current accounts, in addition to the top 1% income
share. We follow the same general-to-specific model selection approach used above.9
The results in Table 8 show that when we control for these different channels through
which income inequality may affect the likelihood of financial crises, it still has unilateral
predictive power, although its effect is somewhat diminished. In addition, the results show
that a larger US mutual fund industry increases the risk of a financial crisis, but only imme-
diately before a crisis erupts.
In summary, our in-sample results suggest that credit growth plays a role in predicting
financial crises, as highlighted by previous studies. It is a good univariate predictor and
has statistically significant predictive power in a multi-predictor setting for the post-WW2
period. However, we do not find an effect of credit growth in the multivariable full sample
estimations. Meanwhile, in contrast to some of the previous literature, our results highlight
results are similar to those for the top 1% income share and are available upon request. Because the top 10%
income share series are basically unavailable for the pre-WWII period, we do not use them in our primary
analysis.
9None of the lags of housing prices has statistically significant explanatory power, and thus, this variable
is excluded from the final estimation results presented in Table 8. In contrast, Jorda et al. (2015) find some
predictive power for housing prices but in a model with fewer other control variables. In our model, the
individual predictive power of real housing prices is rather high (AUROC=0.81), but its coefficient becomes
statistically non-significant after the top 1% income share is added to the regression. The individual predictive
power of US mutual funds is also high (AUROC=0.65).
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an explicit role of income inequality as a crisis predictor in all subperiods and specifications.
One possible reason that our results partially differ from those of previous studies is that we
employ general-to-specific model selection that begins with a variety of real and financial
factors and their lags. This process makes our procedure less restrictive. In general, we
conclude that the power to predict financial crises is distributed among several variables and
their lags.
4.3 Out-of-Sample Forecasting Performance: 1980-2008
The estimation results in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 suggest that it is possible to obtain statisti-
cally significant in-sample predictive power for financial crisis periods in different developed
countries. Next, we turn to exploring out-of-sample forecasts for the recent crisis periods.
Similar to Schularick and Taylor (2012), we consider rolling regressions using the lagged
data to forecast financial crisis periods during the period from 1980 to 2008. A given model
is estimated using data from the beginning of the sample to time T using the information set
FT to construct one-year-ahead probability forecasts (see (3)) for the observations yi,T+1, i =
1, . . . ,N. This procedure is repeated for each year through the end of the sample. This type
of analysis leads to a more realistic comparison of the predictive ability of different variables
and models because no future data are included in the information set when estimating the
parameters of the models.10 This exercise can therefore also be regarded as a robustness
check against the potential overfitting of the logit models considered in Sections 4.1 and
4.2.
Table 9 reports the forecasting results. We use the out-of-sample AUROC as the crite-
rion to assess forecasting performance because of the lack of a widely used out-of-sample
version of the pseudo-R2 measure. However, we note that the AUROC criterion and related
tests are originally designed for in-sample analyses, and their out-of-sample results should
therefore be interpreted as indicating tendencies in the predictive power of variables. Col-
umn 1 of Table 9 shows the AUROC for the full sample of 14 countries over the entire
observation period, while column 2 focuses on the “common sample” that consists of the
10However, we note that real-time data are often unavailable, i.e., data for different variables may be released
with a time lag and revised later on.
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same observations used for all models.11
The first seven rows of the table report the results for each individual predictor vari-
able. The results show that loan growth performs best out-of-sample, independent of the
estimation sample that we consider. The top 1% income share also does perform rather
well, but in contrast to the in-sample findings it is not the best sole predictor. This picture
changes, however, when we employ the joint model from Table 4 in the out-of-sample anal-
ysis, as presented in the bottom four rows of Table 9.12 First, it is important to note that
these models yield superior forecasting accuracy compared with any single predictor. This
finding confirms the importance of using various predictive variables in forecasting finan-
cial crises. Meanwhile, loan growth loses its predominant role when we control for other
obviously important financial and real factors. The model without real bank loans leads to
a smaller loss in terms of the out-of-sample AUROC compared with the model excluding
the top 1% income share. This diminishing role of loan growth when we control for various
other predictive factors is consistent with the in-sample results reported in Table 5. When
the common sample is used, the difference between real bank loans and the top 1% income
share becomes negligible.
4.4 Out-of-Sample Performance: Varying Forecasting Periods
The selection of the forecasting period (1980–2008) may affect our out-of-sample results
obtained in Section 4.3. In particular, the era beginning in the early 1980s is commonly
referred to as the period of financial liberation, marked by a phenomenal rise in the share
of bank assets to GDP (Singh 1997; Schularick and Taylor 2012). This trend may have
increased the predictive power of real bank loans during this period.13
In Section 4.3, the model specifications and the lag lengths of the predictors are based on
11The sample is limited by the variable that has the fewest observations, which is the top 1% income share,
such that every estimation uses the same time dimension. However, the sample is not balanced because some
variables have missing observations in some years. Again, Canada and the Netherlands are excluded from this
analysis.
12Because of numerical convergence issues in the estimation of the model, we had to omit the two longest
lags of the top 1% income share variable. In all other aspects, the model is the same as in Table 5.
13Rivas and Perez-Quiros (2015) also find that the predictive role of credit in the identification of the busi-
ness cycle was limited before the financial crash of 2007-2008.
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the model selection results obtained for the full sample period. In this section, by contrast
and as a robustness check, we consider different forecasting periods, with the lag lengths
specifically selected for each period using the data up to the starting point of the forecasting
sample. For instance, for the 1950–2008 period, the model selection and parameter esti-
mation are conducted using the sample period through 1949. Again, these results should
be interpreted with caution because some forecasting periods contain few crises. For this
reason, we consider models with only one predictor in this analysis.
The Table 10 results offer several interesting insights. First, none of the lags of real bank
loans is statistically significant in the in-sample model selection when data through 1979 are
used. Therefore, real bank loans are omitted from the out-of-sample forecasts for the period
from 1980 to 2008. Second, only the top 1% income share, current account and real stock
prices yield satisfactory predictive power in all time periods (AUROC > 0.5), although they
usually do not exhibit the best individual predictive power. This finding implies that there
are few universally strong predictors of crises and that economists and policy makers should
pay attention to a range of factors. Third, the predictive power of our variables increases
when we focus on the more recent decades between 1990 and 2008. Most variables actually
have little or no predictive power when we use the entire post-WW2 period in column 2 as
the forecasting period, but they yield better predictive power in the period from 1990 to 2008
(column 3). Fourth, further dividing the recent decades into two shorter periods comprising
the years from 1990 to 2000 (column 4) and from 2000 to 2008 (column 5) emphasizes that
focusing on shorter sample periods might lead to incomplete conclusions.
In conclusion, our out-of-sample forecasting results underpin the importance of focusing
on various real and financial variables and assessing various forecasting periods to under-
stand the drivers of financial crises.
5 Discussion
Our results imply that income inequality has a distinct role as a driver of financial crises.
More precisely, the results presented in Section 4.2 suggest that even when trying to include
all the channels proposed in the literature through which income inequality may lead to
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financial instability our measure of inequality still has predictive power. However, in our at-
tempt we might not fully capture, e.g., the extent of the risk-taking of wealthier households.
We miss data on hedge fund activities or subprime derivatives. We also do not have indi-
cators for the increased risk-taking of banks in the form of subprime securitization. In ad-
dition, while financial deregulation leads to the observed increased risk-taking of wealthier
households and banks and to current account imbalances, our variables might not capture all
facets of the effects of financial deregulation (e.g. financial innovation, speculation, market
integration as well as financial fragility and contagion) and how income inequality interacts
with them.
A long-term cross-country study on the macro-level as ours is likely to not fully identify
the above mentioned effects. This aspect raises two interesting questions for future research.
First, financial deregulation is a phenomenon of the past 20-30 years, whereas our focus
lies on the last 50-100 years. An interesting question then would be how to establish a
long-term measure that captures the risky investments of the rich households and banks in
different time periods in a comparable manner. Second, a micro-level study that exploits
specific deregulatory measures or institutional changes in one country might add to our
understanding of the effects of deregulation and income inequality on the probability of a
crisis. However, the latter approach then comes at the cost of studying a very narrow sample.
Future research may also broaden the analysis by linking the predictive performance of
various factors to the underlying characteristics of financial systems at different times. For
instance, the effect of income inequality on financial stability might depend on the quality
of credit growth, that is, the types of loans that are extended and the types of borrowers that
take up these loans.
It is known that income inequality can have a broad effect on the economy. If income
inequality leads to shorter growth spells (Berg and Ostry 2011) and, more broadly, to higher
macroeconomic fluctuations (see, e.g., Motta and Tirelli (2014); Kalliovirta and Malinen
(2015)), it is likely to increase the likelihood of crises by increasing business cycle fluctu-
ations affecting a wide variety of macroeconomic variables, such as business bankruptcies
and the volume of nonperforming loans, which, in turn, are likely to contribute to financial
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instability. Inequality can also lead to high aggregate savings because individuals in higher
income groups tend to save more (Dynan et al. 2004; Eggertson and Mehrotra 2014). Exces-
sive saving hinders consumption, while the imbalance between savings and investment pulls
down the natural interest rates leading to a state of secular stagnation (Hansen 1939; Sum-
mers 2013; Eggertson et al. 2016). This gives rise to a paradox of a high level of speculative
investments (because of the low return of traditional investments) and a low level of real
investments (because of low aggregate demand), which both can increase the likelihood of
financial crises. Also these broader channels need to be further addressed in future studies.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we study the performance of various financial and macroeconomic variables
when predicting financial crisis periods in 14 developed countries over long time periods
of up to more than 100 years. We focus on income inequality in particular because it was
elevated before the recent crisis as well as before the Great Depression in the 1930s but the
empirical evidence on its role as a crisis predictor is scant and mixed. One reason for the
mixed results in the existing literature might be that income inequality can work through
various channels such as asset and credit bubbles indicating that it could be the actual real
root cause for these phenomena. Financial crises also tend to be caused by different factors
at different times, ranging from the run on private banknotes during the Panic of 1819 to
the runs on repo, commercial paper, and primer broker balances during the crisis of 2007-
2008. This is why we use a general-to-specific model selection procedure that begins with a
large array of financial and macroeconomic predictors and their lags, thereby combining the
insights of previous works in the macroeconomic and banking literature. The results show
that the predictive power of our model is clearly distributed among various variables and
their lags.
In particular, we can conclude that in the run-up to a crisis, several variables have sub-
stantial additional predictive power over and above credit booms, which were recently em-
phasized by, e.g., Schularick and Taylor (2012) and Taylor (2015) as the main culprits.
Our results indicate that income inequality is a useful predictor; it is the best predictor in
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in-sample estimations, and it is a universal predictor in out-of-sample forecasts, although
some variables perform better during some out-of-sample forecasting periods. The out-
of-sample forecasts also emphasize that focusing on short subperiods yields considerably
varying results for several factors, such as government debt, which might lead to incomplete
conclusions regarding the usefulness of a certain predictor.
Alarmingly, if income inequality has the destabilizing effect that our results suggest,
then the current trend of increasing inequality could set the stage for further financial tur-
moil. However, to formulate policy interventions clearly more research is warranted to
better understand the potential interconnectedness of different predictive factors, including
bank credit, external imbalances, financial innovation (securitization), asset price booms,
business cycle fluctuations and income inequality to pin down the exact channels through
which factors like income inequality generate financial instability.
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Table 1: Summary statistics of the predictive variables
Variable Transformation Countries Obs. Mean Std. deviation
real bank loans log & 1st diff. 14 1481 0.055 0.08
top 1% income 1st diff. 14 853 0.039 0.72
gross r. investments log & 1st diff. 14 1560 0.022 0.17
current account 1st diff. 14 1548 9.240 206.17
money (M2) log & 1st diff. 14 1574 0.079 0.06
government debt log & 1st diff. 14 1501 0.036 0.10
r. stocks log & 1st diff. 14 1454 0.213 0.23
s.t. real interest 1st diff. 14 1300 -0.041 0.05
deposit insurance - 14 1736 - -
Table 2: In-sample results, full sample period 1870-2008
Variable Obs. Lag length Pseudo-R2 AUROC
∆real bank loans 1398 2 0.046 0.684
∆top 1% income 652 5 0.126 0.766
∆gross r. investments 1373 4 0.028 0.629
∆current account 1431 3 0.033 0.648
∆money (M2) 1491 2 0.025 0.635
∆government debt 1351 4 0.037 0.670
∆r. stocks 1257 4 0.037 0.684
∆s.t. real interest 1061 (none) - -
deposit insurance 1689 (none) - -
Notes: This table reports the values of the pseudo-R2 and the area under the ROC curve (AUROC)
for logit models including one single predictive variable at a time using the full sample (Obs. denotes
the number of observations). The predictive variables are introduced in more detail in Table 1 and
Section 2. The underlying forecast horizon is one year. The lag length is selected using the model
selection procedure introduced in Section 3.2. (None) implies that none of the lags were selected in
the employed model selection procedure.
33
Table 3: In-sample results, loan growth and income inequality, full sample period 1870-2008
Variable (lags) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L1. ∆r. bank loans -0.398 4.523* 0.0301 - 4.28* 5.071**
( 2.110 (2.654) (1.893) (2.574) (1.694)
L2. ∆r. bank loans 7.138*** 9.035** 5.781*** - 9.481** 10.845***
(2.613) (3.642) (1.694) (3.672) (3.228)
L3. ∆r. bank loans 0.888 1.8565 - - -
(2.948) (2.879)
L4. ∆r. bank loans 0.203 0.791 - - -
(1.378) (3.130)
L5. ∆r. bank loans 1.867 0.742 - - -
(1.640) (2.985)
L1. ∆top 1% income - 0.661*** - 0.641** 0.643*** 0.451**
(0.230) (0.249) (0.223) (0.230)
L2. ∆top 1% income - 0.818 - 1.040** 0.786 0.564
(0.513) (0.480) (0.511) (0.494)
L3. ∆top 1% income - 0.308 - 0.381 0.385 0.197
(0.329) (0.310) (0.331) (0.298)
L4. ∆top 1% income - 0.483 - 0.315 0.546*** 0.336
(0.329) (0.269) (0.099) (0.321)
L5. ∆top 1% income - 1.043** - 0.743** 1.019*** 0.904**
(0.418) (0.309) (0.360) (0.354)
L1. ∆top 1%* ∆r. bank loans - - - - - 0.031***
(0.012)
Observations 1272 630 1398 652 645 645
Countries 14 12 14 12 12 12
Pseudo-R2 0.0659 0.193 0.046 0.126 0.192 0.232
AUROC 0.717 0.848 0.684 0.766 0.845 0.864
∆ r. bank loans lags = 0 17.23*** 15.41*** 14.20*** - 14.80*** 19.27***
∆top 1% lags = 0 - 14.67** - 15.68*** 15.60*** 8.10
∆top 1%* ∆r.b. loans lags = 0 - - - - 7.28***
Notes: This table contains the full sample estimation results of logit models when real bank loans and
income inequality are examined as predictors. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.
Lk denotes the kth lag of the variable (i.e., L1. xt = xt−1). L1. top 1%*r. bank loans is the interaction
between the first lags of our indicators for income inequality and credit growth. The results for the
goodness-of-fit measures (Pseudo-R2 and AUROC) and the test statistics for the joint significance of
the lags of the included explanatory variables are also reported. Furthermore, *, ** and *** denote
the statistical significance of the estimated parameter coefficients and the test statistics at the 10%,
5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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Table 4: Marginal effects of income inequality
Variable (lags) full sample <25% (7.2) >75% (11.68) <Sweden (6.2) >US (16.7)
L1. ∆top 1% income 0.114 0.008 0.016 0.007 0.026
L2. ∆top 1% income 0.014 0.009 0.019 0.008 0.031
L3. ∆top 1% income 0.007 0.005 0.010 0.004 0.015
L4. ∆top 1% income 0.010 0.006 0.013 0.006 0.022
L5. ∆top 1% income 0.018 0.012 0.025 0.011 0.041
Sum 0.060 0.040 0.083 0.035 0.135
Observations 645 196 133 117 60
Countries 12 12 12 12 12
Notes: This table presents the marginal effects of income inequality based on the model presented
in Table 3, column 5. It reports the marginal effects for the full sample and subsamples selected
according to the income inequality thresholds given in the first row. The thresholds 25% and 75%
refer to the respective percentiles of the income inequality distribution, while “Sweden” and the “US”
(average inequality levels between 2000–2008) are the example cases of low- and high-inequality
countries.
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Table 5: In-sample results with several predictors, full sample period 1886 -2008
Lags
Variable L1. L2. L3. L4. L5. L6.
∆r. bank loans 6.071 4.728 - - - -
(5.075) (4.803)
∆top 1% 1.063** 1.693*** 1.475*** 1.190** 0.076 -
(0.499) (0.550) (0.427) (0.495) (0.485)
∆g.r. investments 4.071 -4.450* 1.516 -4.177** - -
(3.635) (2.391) (3.419) (1.948)
∆current account -0.0008 -0.0042*** -0.0031* - - - -
(0.0015) (0.0009) (0.0017)
∆gov. debt -6.916* 8.384** -10.492** - - -
(4.025) (3.910) (4.698)
∆r. stocks -3.129** - - - - -
(1.251)
∆s.t. real interest 8.948 -13.999 17.992 -12.357* - -





Test of ∆r. bank loans lags = 0 4.19
Test of ∆top 1% lags = 0 26.03***
Test of ∆g.r. investments lags = 0 13.47***
Test of ∆current account lags = 0 20.21***
Test of ∆gov.debt lags = 0 7.90**
Test of ∆r. stocks lags = 0 6.26**
Test of ∆s.t. real interest lags = 0 5.75
Notes: This table contains the full sample estimation results of logit models when several predictors
and their lags are examined jointly. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. Lk denotes
the kth lag of the variable (i.e., L1. xt = xt−1). L1. top 1%*r. bank loans is the interaction between the
first lags of our indicators for income inequality and credit growth. The results for the goodness-of-fit
measures (Pseudo-R2 and AUROC) and the test statistics for the joint significance of the lags of the
included explanatory variables are also reported. Furthermore, *, ** and *** denote the statistical
significance of the estimated parameter coefficients and the test statistics at the 10%, 5% and 1%
significance levels, respectively.
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Table 6: In-sample results, post-WWII period 1950-2008
Variable Obs. Lag length Pseudo-R2 AUROC
∆real bank loans 721 2 0.071 0.717
∆top 1% income 545 3 0.135 0.781
∆gross r. investments 636 5 0.051 0.686
∆current account 660 3 0.090 0.718
∆money (M2) 722 2 0.043 0.643
∆government debt 679 1 0.067 0.713
∆r. stocks 702 4 0.092 0.777
∆s.t. real interest 607 (none) - -
deposit insurance 754 1 0.085 0.737
Notes: This table reports the values of the pseudo-R2 and the AUROC for logit models including
one single predictive variable at a time when using the post-WWII subsample (Obs. denotes the
number of observations). The predictive variables are introduced in more detail in Table 1 and
Section 2. The underlying forecast horizon is one year. The lag length is selected using the model
selection procedure introduced in Section 3.2. (None) implies that none of the lags were selected in
the employed model selection procedure.
37
Table 7: In-sample results with several predictors, period 1950–2008
Lags
Variable L1. L2. L3. L4. L5. L6.
∆r. bank loans -3.405 17.729*** - - - -
(6.160) (4.453)
∆top 1% 1.251* 3.638*** 2.920*** 1.240 -1.373 -
(0.646) (0.661) (0.852) (1.081) (0.873)
∆g.r. investments 24.170*** -24.233** 6.228 -15.757** - -
(6.502) (9.502) (10.914) (6.692)
∆current account 0.00089 -0.0099*** -0.0073** - - -
(0.0025) (0.0017) (0.0031)
∆gov. debt -15.941*** 8.756 -11.136* - - -
(5.117) (5.706) (5.823)
∆r. stocks -6.007** -3.139* - - - -
(2.051) (1.804)






Test of ∆r. bank loans lags = 0 13.25***
Test of ∆top 1% lags = 0 34.05***
Test of ∆g.r. investments lags = 0 23.99***
Test of ∆current account lags = 0 39.38***
Test of ∆gov.debt lags = 0 17.74**
Test of ∆r. stocks lags = 0 9.03**
deposit insurance lags = 0 8.90***
Notes: This table contains the post-WWII subsample estimation results of logit models when several
predictors and their lags are examined jointly. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.
Lk denotes the kth lag of the variable (i.e., L1. xt = xt−1). L1. top 1%*r. bank loans is the interaction
between the first lags of our indicators for income inequality and credit growth. The results for the
goodness-of-fit measures (Pseudo-R2 and AUROC) and the test statistics for the joint significance of
the lags of the included explanatory variables are also reported. Furthermore, *, ** and *** denote
the statistical significance of the estimated parameter coefficients and the test statistics at the 10%,
5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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Table 8: In-sample results with selected predictors, period 1962–2008
Lags
Variable L1. L2. L3. L4. L5. L6.
∆r. bank loans 4.074 19.142*** - - - -
(5.192) (6.695)
∆top 1% 1.337** 2.655*** 1.247 0.177 -0.023 -
(0.667) (0.741) (1.112) (1.382) (0.797)
∆US mf 1.595** -2.372 -6.311* 0.797 -3.612** -3.972*
(0.785) (2.787) (5.280) (0.623) (1.445) (2.349)
∆r. stocks -3.858*** 0.402 -0.550 4.413** - -
(1.244) (0.774) (1.788) (1.774)






Test of ∆r.b.loans lags = 0 13.40***
Test of ∆top 1 lags = 0 14.75**
Test of ∆US mf lags = 0 10.86*
Test of ∆r. stocks lags = 0 21.19***
Test of ∆current acc. lags = 0 7.76**
Notes: This table contains the 1962-2008 subsample estimation results of logit models when several
predictors and their lags are examined jointly. Four countries are excluded because of a lack of data.
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. Lk denotes the kth lag of the variable (i.e.,
L1. xt = xt−1). L1. top 1%*r. bank loans is the interaction between the first lags of our indicators
for income inequality and credit growth. The results for the goodness-of-fit measures (Pseudo-R2
and AUROC) and the test statistics for the joint significance of the lags of the included explanatory
variables are also reported. Furthermore, *, ** and *** denote the statistical significance of the
estimated parameter coefficients and the test statistics at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels,
respectively.
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Table 9: Out-of-sample AUROCs for the sample period 1980–2008
Model Out of sample Out of sample
(included predictors) AUROC AUROC,
common sample
∆r. bank loans 0.631 0.680
∆top 1% 0.564 0.564
∆g.r. investments 0.548 0.513
∆current account 0.594 0.636
∆money (M2) 0.591 0.496
∆government debt 0.578 0.552
∆r. stocks 0.614 0.605
∆r. bank loans + ∆top 1% 0.635 0.637
Full model (see Table 5) 0.748 0.760
– excluding top 1% 0.646 0.748
– excluding r. bank loans 0.728 0.743
– excluding r. bank loans and top 1% 0.628 0.724
Notes: This table reports the out-of-sample AUROCs for the sample period 1980–2008. The first
seven rows report results from models that include only one single predictor at a time, whereas
the full model refers to the model presented in Table 5 and its subsequent restricted versions. The
common sample refers to a sample that is limited by the variable with the fewest observations, which
is the top 1% income share. However, the sample is not balanced because some variables have
missing observations for some years.
Table 10: Out-of-sample AUROCs for different sample periods
Model 1980-2008 1950-2008 1990-2008 1990-2000 2000-2008
(included predictors)
∆r. bank loans - 0.502 0.736 0.815 0.689
∆top 1% 0.509 0.541 0.571 0.680 0.572
∆g.r. investments 0.513 - 0.574 0.775 -
∆current account 0.595 0.564 0.613 0.825 0.532
∆money (M2) - 0.432 - - 0.474
∆government debt 0.552 0.501 0.648 0.920 0.469
∆r. stocks 0.518 0.502 0.568 0.640 0.566
Notes: This table reports the out-of-sample AUROCs for individual variables in different forecasting
periods. The analysis is conducted with a common sample (see above). "-" indicates that none of the
lags of a variable were statistically significant in the model selection.
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